Abstract. Let G = (A ∪ B, E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching M is popular in G if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable matching is popular; another subclass of popular matchings that always exist and can be easily computed is the set of dominant matchings. A popular matching M is dominant if M wins the head-to-head election against any larger matching. The set of dominant matchings is the linear image of the set of stable matchings in an auxiliary graph. In this paper, we investigate the difference between the tractability of stable and dominant matchings, and its consequence for popular matchings. We give the first known complete description of the dominant matching polytope in the original space and show that it has an exponential number of facets (recall that the stable matching polytope has a linear number of facets). This polyhedral asymmetry is reflected by a complexity asymmetry: We show that it is easy to decide if every popular matching in G is also stable, however it is co-NP hard to decide if every popular matching in G is also dominant. We show that several hardness results in popular matchings, including the above result and the hardness of finding a popular matching in a non-bipartite graph, can be attributed to the NP-hardness of the following two stable matching problems:
Introduction
Consider a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) on n vertices and m edges where each vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. Such a graph, also called a marriage instance, is an extensively studied model in two-sided matching markets. The problem of computing a stable matching in G is classical. A matching M is stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to M , i.e., an edge whose endpoints prefer each other to their respective assignments in M . The notion of stability was introduced by Gale and Shapley [11] in 1962 who showed that stable matchings always exist in G and there is a simple linear time algorithm to find one.
Stable matchings in a bipartite instance G are well-understood [14] with efficient algorithms [18, 25, 9, 23, 10, 24 ] to solve several optimization problems that have many applications in economics, computer science, and mathematics. A formulation of size O(m + n) for the stable matching polytope in R m , i.e., the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of stable matchings of G, is also known [23] .
Here we study a related and more relaxed notion called popularity. This was introduced by Gärdenfors [12] in 1975 who showed that every stable matching is also popular. For any vertex u, its preference over neighbors extends naturally to a preference over matchings as follows: u prefers M to M either if (i) u is matched in M and unmatched in M or (ii) u is matched in both and prefers its partner in M to its partner in M . Let φ(M, M ) be the number of vertices that prefer M to M . Thus a popular matching never loses a head-to-head election against another matching where each vertex casts a vote for the matching that it prefers. Hence a popular matching is a weak Condorcet winner [3, 4] in the corresponding voting instance. It is easy to show that a stable matching is a min-size popular matching [16] . Thus larger matchings and more generally, matchings that achieve more social good, are possible by relaxing the constraint of stability to popularity.
Algorithmic questions for popular matchings in bipartite graphs have been well-studied in the last decade [2, 16, 19, 20, 17, 7, 8] . We currently know efficient algorithms for the following problems in bipartite graphs: (i) min-size popular matchings, (ii) max-size popular matchings, and (iii) finding a popular matching with a given edge. All these algorithms compute either a stable matching or a dominant matching.
Definition 2.
A popular matching M is dominant in G if M is more popular than any larger matching in G, i.e., ∆(M, M ) > 0 for any matching M such that |M | > |M |.
Thus a dominant matching defeats every larger matching in a head-to-head election, so it immediately follows that a dominant matching is a popular matching of maximum size. Dominant matchings always exist in a bipartite graph [16] and a dominant matching can be computed in linear time [19] . Moreover, dominant matchings are the linear image of stable matchings in an auxiliary instance [19, 7] , hence the dominant matching polytope has a compact extended formulation. Very recently, the following rather surprising result was shown [8] : it is NP-hard to decide if a bipartite graph admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant.
Our problems, results, and techniques
Everything known so far about stable and dominant matchings seemed to suggest that those classes play somehow symmetric roles in popular matching problems: both classes are always non-empty and one is a tractable subclass of min-size popular matchings while the other is a tractable subclass of max-size popular matchings. Our first set of results shows this symmetry is not always the case.
Our starting point is an investigation of the complexity of the following two natural and easyto-ask questions on popular matchings in a bipartite graph G:
(1) is every popular matching in G also stable? (2) is every popular matching in G also dominant?
Both these questions are trivial to answer in instances G = (A ∪ B, E) that admit popular matchings of more than one size. Then the answer to both questions is "no" since {dominant matchings} ∩ {stable matchings} = ∅ in such graphs as dominant matchings are max-size popular matchings while stable matchings are min-size popular matchings. Thus, in this case, a dominant matching is an unstable popular matching and a stable matching is a non-dominant popular matching in G. However, when all popular matchings in G have the same size, these questions are non-trivial.
Moreover, it is useful to ask these questions because when there are edge utilities, the problem of finding a max-utility popular matching is NP-hard in general [21] and also hard to approximate within a factor of 2 [8] ; however if every popular matching is stable (similarly, dominant), then the max-utility popular matching problem can be solved in polynomial time. Thus a "yes" answer to either of these questions has applications. We show the following dichotomy here: though both these questions seem analogous, only one is easy-to-answer.
( * ) There is an O(m 2 ) algorithm to decide if every popular matching in G = (A ∪ B, E) is stable, however it is co-NP complete to decide if every popular matching in G = (A ∪ B, E) is dominant.
The first step in proving ( * ) is to show that questions (1) and (2) are equivalent to the following:
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(1 ) is every dominant matching in G also stable? (2 ) is every stable matching in G also dominant?
Since there is a compact description of the stable (resp. dominant) matching polytope in the original (resp. an extended) space, we can immediately deduce that (1 ) (hence (1)) can be answered by solving a polynomial number of LPs, i.e., by maximizing (the left-hand side of) each facet-defining inequality of the stable matching polytope over the compact extended formulation for the dominant matching polytope. In Section 3, we give a combinatorial algorithm that solves (1 ) in time O(m 2 ).
If the dominant matching polytope had a polynomial number of facets (and those were easy to find), a symmetric argument would imply that (2 ) is also solvable in polynomial time. Note that so far a complete, finite description of the dominant matching polytope in the original space was not known. In Section 4, we give such a description, and we show that the dominant matching polytope has an exponential (in m) number of facets. We finally settle the complexity of (2) and (2 ) in Section 5,  showing that the problem is co-NP hard. It is part of mathematical folklore that having a compact extended formulation is "essentially as good as" having a compact description in the original space. This result shows a concrete example where this is not the case.
Our hardness reduction is surprisingly simple when compared to those that appeared in recent publications on popular matchings [8, 13, 21] . We also show that the idea behind our reductions can be employed to show NP-hardness of the following new decision problems (in particular, these hardness results are not implied by the reductions from [8, 13, 21] ): (3) is there a stable matching in G = (A ∪ B, E) that is dominant? (4) is there a max-size popular matching in G that is not dominant? (5) is there a min-size popular matching in G that is not stable?
A general graph (not necessarily bipartite) with strict preference lists is called a roommates instance. Popular matchings need not always exist in a roommates instance and the popular roommates problem is to decide if a given instance admits one or not. The complexity of the popular roommates problem was open for close to a decade and very recently, two independent proofs of NP-hardness [8, 13] of this problem were shown. Both these proofs are rather lengthy and technical.
We use the hardness result for problem (3) to show a short and simple proof of NP-hardness of the popular roommates problem. The hardness result for (5) shows an alternative and much simpler proof of NP-hardness (compared to [8] ) of the following decision problem in a marriage instance G = (A ∪ B, E): is there a popular matching in G that is neither stable nor dominant? 5 We know that all the efficient algorithms known in the domain of popular matchings in bipartite graphs compute either stable matchings or dominant matchings. Dominant matchings in G are stable matchings in a related graph G (see Section 2) and so the machinery of stable matchings is used to solve dominant matching problems. Thus all positive results in the domain of popular matchings can be attributed to stable matchings. Conversely, all hardness results showed in this paper rely on the fact that it is hard to find stable matchings that have / do not have certain augmenting paths. Hence, properties of stable matchings seem to also be responsible for hardness of many popular matching problems.
Background and related results
The first algorithmic question studied in the domain of popular matchings was in the one-sided preference lists model in bipartite graphs: here one side of the graph consists of agents who have preferences over their neighbors while vertices on the other side are objects with no preferences. Popular matchings need not always exist here and an efficient algorithm was shown in [1] to determine if one exists or not.
Popular matchings always exist in bipartite graphs when every vertex has a strict preference list [12] . However when preference lists are not strict, the problem of deciding if a popular matching exists or not is NP-hard [2, 6] . The first non-trivial algorithms designed for computing popular matchings in bipartite graphs with strict preference lists were the max-size popular matching algorithms [16, 19] . These algorithms compute dominant matchings and the term dominant matching was formally defined a few years later in [7] to solve the "popular edge" problem. The notion of popularity easily extends to mixed matchings [22] and the popular fractional matching polytope in bipartite graphs with strict preference lists was shown to be half-integral in [17] .
As mentioned earlier, it was recently shown that it is NP-hard to decide if a marriage instance admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant [8] . This hardness result was shown by a reduction from 1-in-3 SAT and a consequence of this hardness result was the hardness of the popular roommates problem. The NP-hardness of popular roommates problem shown in [13] was by a reduction from a problem called the partitioned vertex cover problem.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 contains preliminaries. Section 3 has our algorithm to decide if G has an unstable popular matching or not. Section 4 studies the dominant matching polytope. Section 5 has our co-NP hardness result. Section 6 shows the NP-hardness of deciding if G has a matching that is both stable and dominant and two consequences of this hardness. Missing details are given in the Appendix.
Preliminaries
Let G = (A ∪ B, E) be our input instance. We will often refer to vertices in A and B as men and women, respectively. Let M be any matching in G. For any edge (a, b) / ∈ M , define vote a (b, M ) as follows: (here M (a) is a's partner in the matching M and M (a) = null if a is unmatched in M )
We can similarly define
. Thus every edge outside M has a label in {(±, ±)}. Note that an edge e is labeled (+, +) if and only if e is a blocking edge to M .
Let G M be the subgraph of G obtained by deleting edges labeled (−, −) from G. The following theorem characterizes dominant matchings.
Theorem 1 ([7]).
A popular matching M is dominant iff there is no M -augmenting path in G M .
The graph G . Dominant matchings in G are equivalent to stable matchings in a related graph G : this equivalence was first used in [7] , later simplified in [8] . The graph G is the bidirected graph corresponding to G. The vertex set of G is the same as the vertex set A ∪ B of G and every edge (a, b) in G is replaced by 2 edges in G : one directed from a to b denoted by (a + , b − ) and the other directed from b to a denoted by (a − , b + ). Let u ∈ A∪B and suppose v 1 v 2 · · · v k is u's preference order in G. Then u's preference order in G is:
That is, every vertex prefers outgoing edges to incoming edges and among outgoing edges, it maintains its original preference order and among incoming edges, it maintains again its original preference order. It was shown in [7, 8] that any stable matching M in G projects to a dominant matching M in G by setting (a, b) ∈ M if and only if either (a
is in M , and conversely, any dominant matching in G can be realized as a stable matching in G .
Witness of a popular matching. LetG be the graph G augmented with self-loops. That is, we assume each vertex is its own last choice neighbor. So we can henceforth regard any matching M in G as a perfect matchingM inG by including self-loops at all vertices left unmatched in M . The following edge weight function wt M in the augmented graphG will be useful to us. For any edge (a, b) in G, define:
We need to define wt M for self-loops as well: let wt M (u, u) = 0 if u is matched to itself inM , else wt M (u, u) = −1. For any matching N in G, we have wt M (Ñ ) = ∆(N, M ) and so M is popular in G if and only if every perfect matching inG has weight at most 0. Theorem 2 follows from LP-duality and the fact that G is a bipartite graph. Theorem 2 ( [22, 20] ). A matching M in G = (A ∪ B, E) is popular if and only if there exists a vector α ∈ {0, ±1} n such that u∈A∪B α u = 0,
For any popular matching M , a vector α as given in Theorem 2 will be called M 's witness or dual certificate. Any stable matching has 0 as a witness.
Call an edge e popular if there is a popular matching in G that contains e. For any popular edge (a, b), it was shown in [21] that α a + α b = wt M (a, b). This will be a useful fact for us. Another useful fact from [21] is that if vertex u is left unmatched in some popular matching then α u = wt M (u, u); thus α u = 0 if u is left unmatched in M else α u = −1. We will also be using the rural hospitals theorem for stable matchings (see [14] ) that states that all stable matchings match the same subset of vertices. Note that every dominant matching matches the same subset of vertices (via the rural hospitals theorem for stable matchings in G ). More generally, the following fact is true, where V (M ) is the set of vertices matched in a matching M .
Lemma 1 ( [16, 15] ). Let S be a stable, P be a popular, and D be a dominant matching in a marriage
Thus, in particular, in instances where stable matchings have the same size as dominant matchings, all popular matchings match the same subset of vertices.
Finding an unstable popular matching
We are given G = (A∪B, E) with strict preference lists and the problem is to decide if every popular matching in G is also stable, i.e., if {popular matchings} = {stable matchings} or not in G. In this section we show an efficient algorithm to answer this question. Let G admit an unstable popular matching M and let α ∈ {0, ±1} n be M 's dual certificate. Let A 0 be the set of vertices a ∈ A with α a = 0 and let B 0 be the set of vertices b ∈ B with α b = 0. 
Since M is unstable, there is an edge (a, b) that blocks M . Since wt M (a, b) = 2, the endpoints of a blocking edge (a, b) have to satisfy α a = α b = 1; so a ∈ A 1 and b ∈ B 1 . Now we run a transformation M 0 ; D as given in [7] : let G 0 be the graph G restricted to A 0 ∪B 0 . Run Gale-Shapley algorithm in the graph G 0 with the starting matching M 0 = {(u + , v − ) : (u, v) ∈ M 0 and u ∈ A, v ∈ B}, where G 0 is the graph obtained from G 0 as described in Section 2. That is, instead of starting with the empty matching, we start with the matching M 0 in G 0 ; unmatched men in A 0 propose in decreasing order of preference and whenever a woman receives a proposal from a neighbor that she prefers to her current partner (her preferences as given in G 0 ), she rejects her current partner and accepts this proposal. This results in a stable matching in G 0 , equivalently, a dominant matching D in G 0 . It was shown in [7] that M * = M 1 ∪ D is a dominant matching in G. We include a new proof of this in the Appendix (see Claim 7) .
The edge (a, b) blocks M * since the matching M 1 was unchanged by this transformation of
, thus a and b prefer each other to their respective partners in M * . So M * is an unstable dominant matching and Lemma 2 follows.
Lemma 2. If G has an unstable popular matching then G admits an unstable dominant matching.
Hence in order to answer the question of whether every popular matching in G is stable or not, we need to decide if there exists a dominant matching M in G with a blocking edge. As mentioned in Section 1.1, there is an LP-based algorithm for this task. We now present a combinatorial algorithm.
A combinatorial algorithm. We now show a more efficient algorithm for the above problem. This is also based on the equivalence between dominant matchings in G and stable matchings in G . Our task is to determine if there exists a stable matching in G that includes a pair of edges (a + , v − ) and (u − , b + ) such that a and b prefer each other to v and u, respectively, in G. It is easy to decide in O(m 3 ) time whether such a stable matching exists or not in G .
-For every pair of edges e 1 = (a, v) and e 2 = (u, b) in G such that a and b prefer each other to v and u, respectively: determine if there is a stable matching in G that contains the pair of edges (a
In the graph G , we modify Gale-Shapley algorithm so that b rejects proposals from all neighbors ranked worse than u − and v rejects all proposals from neighbors ranked worse than a + . If the resulting algorithm returns a stable matching that contains the edges (a + , v − ) and (u − , b + ), then we have the desired matching; else G has no stable matching that contains this particular pair of edges.
In order to determine if there exists an unstable dominant matching, we may need to go through all pairs of edges (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ E × E. Since we can determine in linear time if there exists a stable matching in G with any particular pair of edges [14] , the running time of this algorithm is O(m 3 ).
A faster algorithm. It is easy to improve the running time to O(m 2 ). For each (a, b) ∈ E we check the following.
(•) Does there exist a stable matching in G such that (1) a + is matched to a neighbor that is ranked worse than b − in a's list, and (2) b + is matched to a neighbor that is ranked worse than a − in b's list?
We modify the Gale-Shapley algorithm in G so that (1) b rejects all offers from superscript + neighbors, i.e., b accepts proposals only from superscript − neighbors, and (2) every neighbor of a that is ranked better than b − rejects proposals from a + . Suppose (•) holds. Then this modified Gale-Shapley algorithm returns among all such stable matchings, the most men-optimal and women-pessimal one [14] . Thus among all stable matchings that match a + to a neighbor ranked worse than b − and that include some edge ( * , b + ), the matching returned by the above algorithm matches b to its least preferred neighbor and a to its most preferred neighbor.
Hence if the modified Gale-Shapley algorithm returns a matching that is (i) unstable or (ii) includes an edge (a − , * ) or (iii) matches b + to a neighbor better than a − , then there is no dominant matching M in G such that the pair (a, b) blocks M . Else we have the desired stable matching in G , call this matching M .
The projection of the matching M on to the edge set of G will be a dominant matching in G with (a, b) as a blocking edge. Since we may need to go through all edges in E and the time taken for any edge (a, b) is O(m), the entire running time of this algorithm is O(m 2 ). We have thus shown the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Given G = (A ∪ B, E) with strict preferences, we can decide in O(m 2 ) time whether every popular matching in G is stable or not; if not, we can return an unstable popular matching.
The dominant matching polytope
The equivalence between dominant matchings in G = (A ∪ B, E) and stable matchings in G = (A ∪ B, E ) implies that the dominant matching polytope of G admits a compact formulation in R 2m , where |E | = 2|E| = 2m. In this section we investigate the description of the dominant matching polytope of G in the original space R m . Recall that all dominant matchings in G match the same subset of vertices (see Section 2). Let A ⊆ A and B ⊆ B be the subsets of A and B matched in every dominant matching in G. Let E * ⊆ E be the set of dominant edges in G, i.e., e ∈ E * if there is a dominant matching in G with the edge e. The set E * can be efficiently determined as the set of stable edges in G [14] . Suppose x ∈ R m is a convex combination of dominant matchings. Then we have:
x e = 1 ∀u ∈ A ∪ B , x e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E * , and
where δ(u) ⊆ E is the set of edges incident to u. For any matching M in G, let ∆(M, x) be the sum of votes for M versus x in an election between M and x. More concretely, in this election a vertex u / ∈ A ∪ B puts in a vote of 1 for M versus x if it is matched in M , else its vote for M versus x is 0; every vertex u ∈ A ∪ B puts in a vote which is a value in [−1, 1] for M versus x, more precisely, u's vote is v :v ≺uv x uv − v :v uv x uv , where v is u's partner in M and the set {v : v ≺ u v} is the set of neighbors ranked worse than v in u's preference order and the set {v : v u v} is the set of neighbors ranked better than v in u's preference order. The sum of all these votes is ∆(M, x).
Let U = (A ∪ B) \ (A ∪ B ) be the set of unmatched vertices in any dominant matching in G. Note that U has to be an independent set in G. For any matching M in G, let k M ≥ 0 be the number of vertices in U that are matched in M . Consider the following family of constraints:
Let D G ⊂ R m be the polytope defined by the constraints in (1) and (2).
This section is devoted to prove the first part of Theorem 4. The second part will be shown in Section 5.1, after a suitable gadget has been introduced in Section 5.
Recall that having a compact description of D G in the original space would allow us to decide if G has a stable matching that is non-dominant in polynomial time. We will show in Section 5 that the problem of deciding if G has a stable matching that is non-dominant is NP-hard, hence we do not expect D G to have a polynomial number of facets. However, the negative result from Theorem 4 is stronger, since it is existential and moreover does not rely on P = NP or any complexity theory assumption. The polytope D G . We will now prove that D G is the convex hull of dominant matchings in G. The starting point is the observation that there is an efficient separation oracle for the constraints that define D G . Given a point x that satisfies the constraints in (1), we can efficiently determine if x satisfies all the constraints in (2) or not by solving the following max-cost perfect matching problem.
-Define the cost function c x inG as follows: (recall thatG is G with self-loops)
• for (a, b) ∈ E where a ∈ A and b ∈ B do: let c x (a, b) be the sum of votes of a and b for each other versus their respective assignments in x, i.e., we have:
• for (a, b) ∈ E where either a or b is in U do: c x (a, b) = 1.
• for every u ∈ A ∪ B do:
Claim 1 For any x that satisfies the constraints in (1), x ∈ D G if and only if c x (M ) ≤ 0 for every perfect matching M inG.
Observe that if we had assigned c x (a, b) = 0 for edges (a, b) where either a or b is in U , then for every e ∈ E it would have been the case that c x (e) is the sum of votes of the endpoints of e for each other versus their respective assignments in x. Thus it would have been c x (M ) = ∆(M, x) for any perfect matching M inG. With the above assignment of costs, i.e., with c x (a, b) = 1 for edges (a, b) where either a or b is in U , we now have c x (M ) = ∆(M, x) + k M for any perfect matching M inG. Thus Claim 1 follows.
Consider the max-cost perfect matching LP inG: this is LP1 given below in variables y e for e ∈ E ∪ {(u, u) : u ∈ A ∪ B}. The linear program LP2 is the dual of LP1. The dual variables are α u for u ∈ A ∪ B.
So x ∈ R m that satisfies the constraints in (1) also satisfies the constraints in (2) if and only if the optimal solution of LP1 is 0, equivalently, if and only if the optimal solution of LP2 is 0; thus x ∈ D G if and only if there exists a dual feasible α ∈ R n such that u∈A∪B α u = 0. Hence D G has the following compact extended formulation:
u∈A∪B α u = 0 and
x e ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E * and x e = 0 ∀e ∈ E \ E *
We now argue that every dominant matching along with its witness satisfies constraints (3)- (5), i.e. every dominant matching belongs to D G . It is known [7, 8] that every dominant matching has a witness α ∈ {0, ±1} n where α u ∈ {±1} for every matched vertex u.
6 Let x be the characteristic vector of a dominant matching M and α such a witness. By Theorem 2 and by construction, (x, α) satisfies all constraints (3)- (5), possibly with the exception of the left constraint in (3) when one of a, b belongs to U . So let us show that this is also satisfied. Assume wlog that a ∈ U and b is matched in M . From Section 2, we know that α a = 0. Hence, by Theorem 2, α b ≥ wt M (a, b) = 0. Since α b ∈ {±1}, it must be that α b = 1, hence α a + α b = 1 = c x (a, b), as required.
Let P G be the polytope described by (3)- (5). We will now show another formulation of P G : this formulation will be more convenient for us.
Lemma 3. The polytope defined by constraints (6)- (9) is P G .
Proof. Consider any point (x, α) that satisfies constraints (6)- (9). Since x does not use any edge incident to any vertex in U , we have c x (x) = ∆(x, x) = 0. Also x e = 0 for all e / ∈ E * and α u = 0 for all u ∈ U . Thus:
Hence u∈A∪B α u = 0. Also α u ≥ −1 for all u ∈ A ∪ B and α u = 0 for all u ∈ U implies that α u ≥ c x (u, u) for all u ∈ A ∪ B. Thus the polytope defined by constraints (6)-(9) is a subset of P G .
Conversely, consider any point (x, α) ∈ P G . Since u∈A∪B α u = 0, α is an optimal solution to LP2. Observe that any dominant matching is an optimal solution to LP1. Hence it follows from complementary slackness that α a + α b = c x (a, b) for every dominant edge (a, b). Also, again by complementary slackness we have α u = 0 for all u ∈ U since every dominant matching, as a perfect matching inG, includes the self-loop (u, u) for u ∈ U . Thus P G is a subset of the polytope defined by constraints (6)- (9) . This proves the lemma.
In order to conclude the proof of the first statement of Theorem 4, we use the formulation of P G as given by constraints (6)-(9) to show Lemma 4 (its proof is given in the Appendix). The proof of Lemma 4 will be based on the proof of integrality of the popular fractional matching polytope C G from [17] when G admits a perfect stable matching, i.e., one that matches all vertices. The polytope C G is defined by the constraints: x is in the matching polytope of G and ∆(M, x) ≤ 0 for all matchings in G. Note that C G need not be integral when G has unstable vertices [20, 17] .
Finding a non-dominant popular matching
Given an instance G = (A ∪ B, E) with strict preference lists, the problem we consider here is to decide if every popular matching is also dominant, i.e., to decide if {popular matchings} = {dominant matchings} or not in G. The following lemma is the counterpart of Lemma 2.
Lemma 5. If G has a non-dominant popular matching M then G admits a non-dominant stable matching N . If M is given, then N can be found efficiently.
Proof. Let M be a non-dominant popular matching in G and α ∈ {0, ±1} n its dual certificate. We will use the decomposition illustrated in Fig. 1 to show the existence of a non-dominant stable matching in G. As per the decomposition in Fig. 1 
Since M is not dominant, there exists an M -augmenting path ρ in G M . The endpoints of ρ (call them u and v) are unmatched in M , hence α u = α v = 0 (see Section 2) and so u and v are in A 0 ∪ B 0 .
In the graph G M , the vertices in B −1 ∪ A −1 (these vertices have α-value −1) are adjacent only to vertices in A 1 ∪ B 1 as all other edges incident to vertices in B −1 ∪ A −1 are (−, −) edges, and these are not present in G M . Suppose the M -alternating path ρ leaves the vertex set A 0 ∪ B 0 , i.e., suppose it contains a non-matching edge between A 0 ∪ B 0 and A 1 ∪ B 1 . Since the partners of vertices in A 1 ∪ B 1 are in B −1 ∪ A −1 , the path ρ can never return to A 0 ∪ B 0 . However we know that the last vertex v of ρ is in A 0 ∪ B 0 . Thus ρ never leaves A 0 ∪ B 0 , i.e., ρ is an M 0 -augmenting path in G * M0 , where G * is the graph G restricted to vertices in A 0 ∪ B 0 . We now run a transformation M 1 ; S as given in [7] to convert M 1 into a stable matching S as follows. The matching S is obtained by running Gale-Shapley algorithm in the subgraph G 1 , which is the graph G restricted to (A\A 0 )∪(B \B 0 ): however, rather than starting with the empty matching, we start with the matching given by M 1 ∩ (A −1 × B 1 ). So unmatched men (these are vertices in A 1 to begin with) propose in decreasing order of preference and whenever a woman receives a proposal from a neighbor that she prefers to her current partner (her preferences as given in G), she rejects her current partner and accepts this proposal. This results in a stable matching S in G 1 .
It was shown in [7] that N = M 0 ∪ S is a stable matching in G. We include a proof in the Appendix (see Claim 8) . Since ρ is an M 0 -augmenting path in G * M0 and M 0 is a subset of N , it follows that ρ is an N -augmenting path in G N . Thus N is a non-dominant stable matching in G.
Our problem now is to decide if there exists a non-dominant stable matching M in G, i.e., a stable matching M with an M -augmenting path in G M . We will show this problem to be NP-hard by showing a a simple reduction from 3SAT. Given a 3SAT formula φ, we transform φ = C 1 ∧· · ·∧C m as follows: let X 1 , . . . , X n be the n variables in φ. For each i:
-replace all occurrences of ¬X i in φ with X n+i (a single new variable); -add the clauses X i ∨ X n+i and ¬X i ∨ ¬X n+i to capture ¬X i ⇐⇒ X n+i .
Thus the updated formula
. . , C m are the original m clauses with negated literals substituted by new variables and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n: C m+i is the clause X i ∨ X n+i and D m+n+i is the clause ¬X i ∨ ¬X n+i .
Corresponding to the above formula φ, we will construct an instance G φ whose high-level picture is shown below. There are two degree 1 vertices s, t along with u i , v i for 0 ≤ i ≤ m + 2n, and one gadget for each literal in every clause. The edge (u i , v i ) is the link between the gadget corresponding to the i-th clause and the (i + 1)-st clause, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m + 2n − 1.
Fig . 2 . The high-level picture of the instance G φ . The numbers on edges denote vertex preferences. That is, u0's first choice is v0 and second choice is s.
In Fig. 2 , Z i,j is the gadget corresponding to the j-th literal of the i-th clause, where each clause has 2 or 3 literals. Corresponding to every occurrence of each literal, we have a separate gadget. That is, there is a separate gadget for each occurrence of x ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n } in φ. Remark 1. Note that, for each variable x ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n }, we can assume that there is exactly one occurrence of ¬x in our transformed formula φ. Hence there is exactly one gadget in G φ that corresponds to ¬x.
The gadgets corresponding to an occurrence of x in the i-th clause and the occurrence of ¬x are given in Fig. 3 . Let D k be the clause that contains the unique occurrence of ¬x in the transformed formula φ.
We We now describe the preference lists of the 4 vertices in the gadget of x in the clause C i .
We now describe the preference lists of the 4 vertices in the gadget of ¬x (see Fig. 3 ).
Here a i , a j , . . . are the occurrences of the a-vertex in all the gadgets corresponding to literal x in the formula φ. That is, the literal x occurs in clauses i, j, . . . The order among the vertices a i , a j , . . . in d k 's preference list does not matter.
We now describe the preference lists of vertices u i and v i . The preference list of u 0 is v 0 s and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m + n, the preference list of u i is as given on the left (these correspond to positive clauses C i ) and for m + n + 1 ≤ i ≤ m + 2n, the preference list of u i is as given on the right (these correspond to negative clauses D i ):
where b ij (similarly, d ij ) is the b-vertex (resp., d-vertex) that appears in the gadget corresponding to the j-th literal in the i-th clause. If the i-th clause (a positive one) consists of only 2 literals then there is no b i3 here. The vertex v i is underlined. The preference list of v m+2n is u m+2n t and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m + n, the preference list of v i−1 is as given on the left (these correspond to positive clauses C i ) and for m + n + 1 ≤ i ≤ m + 2n, the preference list of v i is as given on the right (these correspond to negative clauses D i ):
where a ij (similarly, c ij ) is the a-vertex (resp., c-vertex) that appears in the gadget corresponding to the j-th literal in the i-th clause. If the i-th clause (a positive one) consists of only 2 literals then there is no a i3 here. The vertex u i−1 is underlined. It would be convenient to call the set {(u i , v i ) : 0 ≤ i ≤ m + 2n} the basic set of edges. Let M be the matching given by the union of the basic set
The following lemma is based on this fact.
Lemma 6. Let S be any stable matching in G φ . Then (i) S does not contain any consistency edge and (ii) S is a superset of the basic set.
Proof. Consider the matching N given by the union of the basic set, the pair of dashed blue edges from the gadget of every positive literal, and the pair of dotted red edges from the gadget of every negative literal. It is easy to see that N is a stable matching. Every consistency edge is labeled (−, −) wrt N . Thus every consistency edge is unstable, proving (i).
Observe that every edge (v i−1 , a i ) is labeled (−, −) wrt N . Similarly, every edge (d k , u k ) is also labeled (−, −) wrt N . Thus no stable matching can contain these edges. Recall that all the u-vertices and v-vertices are stable, so this immediately implies that v i−1 is matched to u i−1 for all i ≤ m + n and u k is matched v k for all k ≥ m + n + 1. Also recall that the 4 vertices in each literal gadget are stable. This implies u m+n and v m+n are also matched to each other in every stable matching, proving (ii). Corollary 1. For any stable matching S in G φ and any variable x ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n }, we have:
2. From a gadget of x, say, its gadget in the i-th clause, either the pair of edges (i)
The following claim is easy to show.
Claim 2 All popular matchings in G φ have the same size and match the same set of vertices.
Proof. Consider the matching M given by the union of the basic set with the pair of dashed blue edges from the gadget of every literal. Note that M is a stable matching in G. We claim that M is also a dominant matching in G. Since a dominant (resp. stable) matching is a popular matching of maximum (resp. minimum) size, the first claim follows. The second is then implied by Lemma 1. Consider the edge (v 0 , a 1 ): this is labeled (−, −) wrt M since both v 0 and a 1 prefer their partners in M to each other. Thus there is no s-t path in the graph G φ,M (this is the graph G φ after removing edges labeled (−, −) wrt M ). As s and t are the only unmatched vertices, there is no M -augmenting path in G φ,M . So M is a dominant matching in G φ by Theorem 1.
Claim 3 Let S be a stable matching in G φ and ρ an augmenting path in G φ,S . Then ρ goes from s to t and does not use any consistency edge.
Proof. We know that stable matchings in G φ leave only 2 vertices unmatched: these are s and t. So ρ must go from s to t. Recall that consistency edges cannot be included in S, see Lemma 6. By parity reasons, traversing ρ from s to t, a consistency edge can only occur in ρ if it leads ρ back to an earlier clause. That is, a consistency edge (a i , d k ) has to be traversed in ρ in the direction d k → a i . Let e = (d k , a i ) be the first consistency edge traversed in ρ. Observe that ρ cannot reach t, because nodes v i−1 and u i must have already been traversed by ρ. Hence, consistency edges cannot appear in ρ.
From augmenting paths to satisfying assignments. We show that if G φ has a stable matching S that is not dominant then φ is satisfiable. We will use Corollary 1 to set a feasible true/false assignment corresponding to S: if the dashed blue pair of edges from ¬x's gadget is included in S then set x = false else set x = true. The stability of S implies that when x = false, then S has to contain the dashed blue pair of edges from every gadget of x-otherwise some consistency edge would be a blocking edge to S.
Recall that, by Theorem 1, there is an augmenting path ρ in G φ,S . Because of Claim 3, ρ goes from s to t, traverses all clauses, and for each clause i, there is a path in G φ,S between v i−1 and u i . The literal whose gadget provides this v i−1 → u i path is set to true and thus the i-th clause is satisfied. As this holds for each i, this means that φ has a satisfying assignment.
From satisfying assignments to augmenting paths. For any true/false assignment A to the variables in φ, we define an associated matching M A as follows. For any x ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n } do: We also include the basic edges. It is easy to see that M A is a stable matching. We will now show the following fact.
Claim 4 If A is a feasible assignment, then M A is not dominant.
Proof. Consider the j-th clause.
-Let this clause be x ∨ y ∨ z. Since A is a satisfying assignment, at least one of x, y, z is set to true. Assume wlog it is x. So (a j , b j ) and (a j , b j ) are in M A : this implies the existence of the M A -alternating path v j−1 − (a j , b j ) − (a j , b j ) − u j between v j−1 and u j in G φ,M A . -Let the j-th clause be ¬x ∨ ¬y. Since A is a satisfying assignment, either x or y is set to false. Assume wlog it is x. So (c j , d j ) and (c j , d j ) are in M A : this implies the existence of the M A -alternating path
By gluing together all these alternating paths along with the matching edges (u i , v i ) for all i and including the corner edges (s, u 0 ) and (v m+2n , t), we get an M A -augmenting path in G φ,M A . Thus M A is not dominant. This concludes the proof of the claim.
Thus we have shown the following theorem which implies the co-NP hardness claimed in ( * ) in Section 1. Since it is easy to verify that a matching is popular and not dominant (see Theorem 1 and Theorem 2), we have co-NP completeness.
Theorem 5. Given G = (A ∪ B, E) where every vertex has a strict ranking over its neighbors, it is NP-complete to decide if G admits a popular matching that is not dominant.
D G has exponentially many facets
In this section, we prove the second statement from Theorem 4, i.e., that D G has Ω(c m ) facets, for some constant c > 1. For any even k, consider the SAT instance φ defined by:
φ has 2 k/2 feasible or satisfying assignments, and in particular, for each feasible assignment, there is exactly one literal in each clause that makes the clause true. Following Section 5, construct the associated marriage instance G φ and from the construction we have m = Θ(k). Recall that: -to each feasible assignment A of φ corresponds a distinct stable, non-dominant matching M A of G φ (see Claim 4). Call the family of those matchings S.
Let S ∈ S. Because of Claim 3 and the proof of Claim 4, there exists an S-augmenting path ρ S from s to t in G φ,S that passes through the corner edges (s, u 0 ) and (v m+2n , t), all basic edges, and for each clause, edges of the gadget corresponding to the unique literal that makes the clause satisfied. Observe moreover that this is the only augmenting path in G φ,S , since any augmenting path goes from s to t, cannot use consistency edges (see Claim 3), and cannot enter the gadget from clause i that is set to false because of the (−, −) edge incident to v i . This also implies that, for any S, S in S such that S = S , we have ρ S = ρ S .
For S ∈ S, let M S be the set of matchings M such that M ⊇ (ρ S \ S). We claim that S satisfies ∆(N, S) ≤ −k N for all matchings N / ∈ M S . Indeed, take N / ∈ M S and let e ∈ (ρ S \ S) \ N . Let G ∈ D G φ , there must be some inequality from (1) or (2) that is not satisfied by (the characteristic vector of) S. One easily checks that S satisfies all inequalities from (1). Hence, S must be cut off by an inequality ∆(M, S) ≤ −k M for some M ∈ M S . Thus, in any minimal system contained in (1)- (2), at least one inequality ∆(M, S) ≤ −k M for some M ∈ M S is present.
Since M S ∩ M S = ∅ for S = S in S, any such minimal system contains at least |S| = 2 k/2 = 2 Θ(k) inequalities. Theorem 4 then follows from the fact that inequalities in a minimal system are in one-to-one correspondence with the facets of the polyhedron they describe, see e.g. [5, Theorem 3.30].
Max-size popular matchings
A non-dominant popular matching trivially exists if the size of a stable matching differs from the size of a dominant matching in an instance. Our next result is tailored for such instances. We will now show that it is NP-hard to decide if G admits a max-size popular matching that is not dominant.
Problem 3 Input:
A bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) with strict preference lists. Decide: If there is a non-dominant matching among max-size popular matchings in G.
Given a 3SAT formula φ, we will transform it as described earlier and build the graph G φ . Recall that all popular matchings in G φ have the same size. We proved in Theorem 5 that it is NP-hard to decide if G φ admits a popular matching that is not dominant. Consider the graph H = G φ ∪ ρ where ρ is the path p 0 , q 0 , p 1 , q 1 with p 1 and q 0 being each other's top choices. There are no edges between a vertex in ρ and a vertex in G φ . A max-size popular matching in H consists of the pair of edges (p 0 , q 0 ), (p 1 , q 1 ), and a popular matching in G φ .
Hence a max-size popular matching in H that is not dominant consists of (p 0 , q 0 ), (p 1 , q 1 ), and a popular matching in G φ that is non-dominant. Thus the desired result immediately follows. Theorem 6. Given G = (A ∪ B, E) where every vertex has a strict ranking over its neighbors, it is NP-complete to decide if G admits a max-size popular matching that is not dominant.
Other hardness results
Given an instance G = (A ∪ B, E) with strict preference lists, we consider here the problem of deciding if G admits a matching that is both stable and dominant. In instances where all popular matchings have the same size, such a matching M is desirable as there are no blocking edges wrt M ; moreover, M defeats any larger matching in a head-to-head election.
We will now show the above problem is NP-complete. We will then use this hardness to show the NP-completeness of deciding if G admits a min-size popular matching that is unstable and also to give a short proof of NP-hardness of the popular roommates problem.
Finding a matching that is both stable and dominant
Problem 4 Input: A bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) with strict preference lists. Decide: If there is a stable matching in G that is also dominant.
We will show a simple reduction from 3SAT to the above problem. Given a 3SAT formula φ, we will transform φ as done in Section 5 so that there is exactly one occurrence of ¬x in φ for every variable x.
Corresponding to the above formula φ, we will construct an instance G φ whose high-level picture is shown in Fig. 4 . There are two "unwanted" vertices s, t along with u i , v i for every clause in φ, where i is the number of literals in clause , along with one gadget for each literal in every clause. In Fig. 4 , Z j is the gadget corresponding to the j-th literal of clause , where each clause has 2 or 3 literals. As before, we have a separate gadget for every occurrence of each literal. That is, there is a separate gadget for each occurrence of x ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n } in φ and another gadget for the unique occurrence of ¬x in φ. We now describe the preference lists of the 4 vertices a 1 , b 1 , a 1 , b 1 in the gadget of x in the i-th clause. We assume x to be the first literal in this clause. Note that the consistency edge now exists between the b-vertex in x's gadget and the c-vertex in ¬x's gadget (see Fig. 5 ).
We now describe the preference lists of the 4 vertices c 2 , d 2 , c 2 , d 2 in the gadget of ¬x (see Fig. 5 ). We assume ¬x to be the second literal in this clause (let this be the k-th clause).
Here b i , b j . . . are the occurrences of the b-vertex in all the gadgets corresponding to literal x in the formula φ. The order among these vertices in c 2 's preference list is not important.
We now describe the preference lists of vertices u i and v i for 0 ≤ i ≤ r in clause , where r ∈ {2, 3} is the number of literals in this clause. The preference list of u 0 is v 0 s and the preference list of v r is u r t.
Let 1 ≤ j ≤ r and let a j , b j , a j , b j be the 4 vertices in the gadget of the j-th literal in this clause. The preference list of u j is as given on the left (resp. right) for positive (resp. negative) clauses.
The preference list of v j−1 is as given on the left (resp. right) for positive (resp. negative) clauses.
Observe that s and t are the last choices for each of their neighbors. The preferences of s and t are not relevant and it is easy to see that s and t are unstable vertices. The following lemma is analogous to Lemma 6. Lemma 7. Let S be any stable matching in G φ . Then S does not contain any consistency edge and the edges (u i , v i ) for all clauses and indices i are in S.
Corollary 2. For any stable matching S in G φ and any variable x ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n }, we have:
Our goal is to show that φ is satisfiable if and only if G φ has a stable matching that is dominant. We will first show that if φ is not satisfiable then every stable matching in G φ is non-dominant.
From unsatisfiability to augmenting paths. Corresponding to any stable matching M , we will define a true/false assignment A M as follows:
-If the dashed blue pair (c k , d k ) and (c k , d k ) from ¬x's gadget belongs to M then A M sets x to true; else A M sets x to false.
Remark 2.
Observe that when x is set to false in A M , i.e., when (c k , d k ) from ¬x's gadget is in M , the dotted red pair (a i , b i ) and (a i , b i ) from x's gadget has to be in M ; otherwise (b i , c k ) would block M -a contradiction to its stability. Since φ is not satisfiable, there exists some clause, say the r-th clause, such that every literal in this clause is set to false in the assignment A M . We will now show an M -augmenting path as follows:
-Let the r-th clause be a positive clause x ∨ y ∨ z. It follows from Remark 2 that M contains the dotted red pair of edges from x's gadget, y's gadget, and z's gadget. Let a 1 , b 1 , a 1 , b 1 be the 4 vertices in x's gadget, a 2 , b 2 , a 2 , b 2 be the 4 vertices in y's gadget, and a 3 , b 3 , a 3 , b 3 be the 4 vertices in z's gadget. Thus we have the following augmenting path wrt M :
-Let the r-th clause be a negative clause ¬x ∨ ¬y. So both x and y are set to true and M contains the dashed blue pair of edges from ¬x's gadget and also from ¬y's gadget. 
From satisfiability to a desired matching. We will now show that if φ is satisfiable then G φ admits a stable matching that is dominant. For any true/false assignment A to the variables in φ, we define an associated matching M A as follows. For any x ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n } do:
-if x = true then include the dashed blue pair (a i , b i ) and (a i , b i ) from x's gadget in every clause that x belongs to; also include the dashed blue pair (c k , d k ) and (c k , d k ) from ¬x's gadget. -if x = false then include the dotted red pair (a i , b i ) and (a i , b i ) from x's gadget in every clause that x belongs to; also include the dotted red pair (c k , d k ) and (c k , d k ) from ¬x's gadget.
We also include the edges (u i , v i ) for all and i. It is easy to see that M A is a stable matching. We will now show that A is a satisfying assignment implies that M A is dominant.
Lemma 8. There is no
Proof. Let be any positive clause. Suppose A sets the j-th literal in this clause to true. Let a j , b j , a j , b j be the 4 vertices in the gadget corresponding to the j-th literal. So (a j , b j ) ∈ M A and hence there is no edge (v j−1 , a j ) in G M A . Thus there is no alternating path between s and t such that all the intermediate vertices on this path correspond to the -th clause.
However there are consistency edges jumping across clauses-so there may be an M A -augmenting path that begins with vertices corresponding to the -th clause and then uses a consistency edge. Let ρ be an M A -alternating path in G M A with s as an endpoint and let (s, u 0 ) be the first edge in ρ. So the prefix of ρ consists of vertices that belong to the -th clause.
Let The case when is a negative clause is even simpler since in this case ρ cannot leave the vertices of the -th clause using a consistency edge. We know that the assignment A sets some literal in the -th clause to true: let this be the k-th literal, so (c k , d k ) ∈ M A and hence there is no edge (d k , u k ) in G M A . Thus there is no M A -augmenting path in G M A in this case also. Theorem 7. Given G = (A ∪ B, E) where every vertex has a strict ranking over its neighbors, it is NP-complete to decide if G admits a matching that is both stable and dominant.
Min-size popular matchings
In this section we investigate the counterpart of Theorem 6, i.e., the complexity of determining if G = (A ∪ B, E) admits a min-size popular matching that is not stable.
Problem 5 Input:
A bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) with strict preference lists. Decide: If there is an unstable matching among min-size popular matchings in G.
Given a 3SAT formula φ, we transform it as described in Section 5 and build the graph G φ as described in Section 6.1. We now augment the bipartite graph G φ into bipartite graph H as follows:
-Add a new vertex w, which is adjacent to each d -vertex in ¬x's gadget for every variable x ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n }. -Add a square t, t , r , r at the t-end of the graph (see Fig. 6 ), where t , r , r are new vertices. Fig. 6 . We add a square t, t , r , r at the end of the graph G φ , and a vertex w as shown in the figure above. Recall that each s-t path in G φ corresponds to a clause in φ.
The preference lists of the vertices in {r, r , t , t} are as follows: r : r t r : r t t : r t t : · · · r t .
Recall that the vertex t is adjacent to the last v -vertex in every clause gadget . The vertex t prefers all its v-neighbors (the order among these is not important) to its neighbors in the square which are r and t and t prefers r to t . Regarding the vertex w, this vertex is the last choice for all its neighbors and w's preference list is some permutation of its neighbors (the order among these neighbors is not important). This finishes the description of the graph H. The proof of Lemma 9 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 6. Lemma 9. Let S be any stable matching in H. Then S contains the edges (u i , v i ) for all clauses and all i and the pair of edges (r, r ), (t, t ). Moreover, S does not contain any consistency edge.
Corollary 3. For any stable matching S in H and any variable x ∈ {X 1 , . . . , X 2n }, we have:
2. From a gadget of x, say its gadget in the i-th clause, either the pair of edges (i)
It follows from Lemma 9 and Corollary 3 that a stable matching in H matches all vertices except s and w. A max-size popular matching in H is a perfect matching: it includes the edges (s, u 0 ), (v 0 , c k ), (d k , w), (d k , c k ) for some negative clause . We now prove the following theorem. Theorem 8. The graph H admits an unstable min-size popular matching if and only if G φ admits a stable matching that is dominant.
The proof of Theorem 8 uses the following characterization of popular matchings from [16] . This characterization holds in non-bipartite graphs as well and will be used in Section 6.3.
Theorem 9 ([16]).
Matching M is popular in instance H if and only if H M does not contain any of the following with respect to M : (i) an alternating cycle with a (+, +) edge; (ii) an alternating path with two distinct (+, +) edges; (iii) an alternating path with a (+, +) edge and an unmatched vertex as an endpoint.
Proof of Theorem 8. Suppose G φ admits a stable matching N that is also dominant. We claim that M = N ∪ {(r, t), (r , t )} is a popular matching in H. Note that there is a blocking edge (r, r ) with respect to M . Since M matches exactly the stable vertices, this would make M an unstable min-size popular matching.
Note that (r, r ) is the only one blocking edge wrt M . Thus property (ii) from Theorem 9 obviously holds. Property (i) holds since the edge (t, t ) is a (−, −) edge wrt M . Thus there is no alternating cycle in H M with the edge (r, r ). We will now show that property (iii) also holds in H M , thus M is a popular matching in H.
There are two unmatched vertices in M : s and w. We need to check that the edge (r, r ) is not reachable via an M -alternating path from either s or w in H M . Since the matching N is dominant in G φ , there is no M -alternating path between s and t in H M . Thus the blocking edge (r, r ) is not reachable from s by an M -alternating path in H M .
Consider the vertex w and any of its neighbors, say d k (see Fig. 5 ). We know that N includes either the dotted red pair of edges (
In both cases, the blocking edge (r, r ) is not reachable in H M by an M -alternating path with (w, d k ) as a starting edge. This proves one side of the reduction.
We will now show the converse. Let M be a min-size popular matching in H that is unstable. Since M is a min-size popular matching, the set of vertices matched in M is the set of stable vertices. Consider the edges (v i−1 , a i ), (d k , u k ), and (b i , c k ) for any , i, and k. There is a stable matching in G (and thus in H) where all these edges are labeled (−, −) (see the proof of Lemma 6). Thus these edges are slack wrt a popular matching and its witness, i.e. 0 here-so they are unpopular edges (see Section 2) . Hence M has to contain the edges (u i , v i ) for all clauses and all i.
The 4 vertices in a literal gadget are matched among themselves, i.e., either the dotted red pair or the dashed blue pair from each literal gadget belongs to M . Also, the consistency edge cannot be a blocking edge to M as this would make a blocking edge reachable via an M -alternating path in H M from the unmatched vertex w, a contradiction to M 's popularity in H (by Theorem 9).
Since M is unstable, there is a blocking edge wrt M . The only possibility is from within the square r, r , t , t . Thus M has to contain the pair of edges (r, t) and (r , t ): this makes (r, r ) a blocking edge wrt M . Consider the matching N = M \ {(r, t), (r , t )}. We have already argued that N is a stable matching in G φ .
Suppose N is not dominant in G φ . Then there is an N -alternating path between s and t in G φ,N . Thus in the graph H M , there is an M -alternating path from the unmatched vertex s to the blocking edge (r, r ). This contradicts the popularity of M in H by Theorem 9. Hence N is a dominant matching in G φ .
We proved in Section 6.1 that the problem of deciding if G φ admits a stable matching that is dominant is NP-hard. Thus we can conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Given G = (A ∪ B, E) where every vertex has a strict ranking over its neighbors, it is NP-complete to decide if G admits a min-size popular matching that is not stable.
Our instance H is such that every popular matching here has size either n/2 or n/2 − 1, where n is the number of vertices in H. All popular matchings of size n/2 are dominant since they are perfect matchings. Thus a popular matching M in H is neither stable nor dominant if and only if M is an unstable popular matching of size n/2 − 1, i.e., M is an unstable min-size popular matching in H. So we have shown a new and simple proof of NP-hardness of the problem of deciding if a marriage instance admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant.
A simple proof of NP-hardness of the popular roommates problem
Here we adapt the hardness reduction given in Section 6.1 to show a short and simple proof of hardness of the popular roommates problem.
Problem 6
Input: A (non-bipartite) graph G = (V, E) with strict preference lists. Decide: If there is a popular matching in G.
Given a 3SAT formula φ, we transform it as described in Section 5 and build the graph G φ as described in Section 6.1. We now augment the bipartite graph G φ into a non-bipartite graph H, depicted in Fig. 7 as follows:
-Add edges between s and the d -vertex in ¬x's gadget for every variable x.
-At the other end of the graph G φ , add an edge (t, r) along with a triangle r, r , r , where r, r , r are new vertices. The preference lists of the vertices in {r, r , r , t} are as follows:
r : r r t r : r r r : r r t : · · · r.
The vertex t is adjacent to the last v -vertex in every clause gadget . The vertex t prefers all its v-neighbors (the order among these is not important) to r. The vertex s is the last choice neighbor for all its neighbors. The preference list of s is not relevant. Recall the vertex w used in Section 6.2: now we have merged the vertices s and w. This creates odd cycles, which is allowed here since the graph H is non-bipartite.
Popular matchings in H. Let M be a popular matching in H. Observe that M has to match r, r , and r since each of these vertices is a top choice neighbor for some vertex. Since t is the only outside neighbor of r, r , r , the matching M has to contain the pair of edges (t, r), (r , r ). Note that the edge (r, r ) blocks M .
Let H = H \ {t, r, r , r }. Consider the matching N = M \ {(t, r), (r , r )} in H . Since M is popular in H, the matching N has to be popular in H . We claim N has to match all vertices in H except s. This is because H admits a stable matching: consider S = ∪ ,i {(u i , v i )} ∪ {dashed blue edges in every literal gadget}-this is a stable matching in H . Any popular matching in H has to match all stable vertices (see Lemma 1) . Since the number of vertices in H is odd, the vertex s is left unmatched in N .
Any consistency edge is an unpopular edge in H . This is because there is a stable matching in H where this edge is labeled (−, −) (see the proof of Lemma 6), hence this edge is slack. Also, all vertices in H except s are matched in N . So the following 3 observations hold:
i.e., when the first edge of the alternating path is (s, d k ) for some d k . We know that M includes either the dotted red pair of edges (c k , d k ), (c k , d k ) or the dashed blue pair of edges (c k , d k ), (c k , d k ) from this gadget. In both cases, it can be checked that the blocking edge (r, r ) is not reachable in H M by an M -alternating path with (s, d k ) as the starting edge. This proves one side of the reduction.
X b
Decreasing order of b's preference
incr. order table T into dominant matchings so that x is a convex combination (of the characteristic vectors) of these matchings. For any t ∈ [0, 1), define M t ⊆ A × B as follows:
-let L(t) be the vertical line at distance t from the left boundary of T ; -L(t) intersects (or touches the left boundary of) some cell in T u , for each u ∈ A ∪ B ; call this cell
Claim 5 ([17]) M t is a matching in G.
Claim 5 proves that for any vertex u ∈ A ∪ B , if v belongs to cell T u [t], then u belongs to cell
. Thus M t is a valid matching in G. The proofs of Claim 5 and Claim 6 are given below.
Claim 6 M t is a dominant matching in G.
It is now easy to show that x is a convex combination of dominant matchings. To obtain these matchings, as done in [24] , sweep a vertical line from the left boundary of table T to its right boundary: whenever the line hits the left wall of one or more new cells, a new matching is obtained. If the left wall of the i-th leftmost cell(s) in the table T is at distance t i from the left boundary of T , then we obtain the matching M ti defined analogous to M t above.
Let M 0 , M t1 , . . . , M t d be all the matchings obtained by sweeping a vertical line through the table
Thus x is a convex combination of dominant matchings in G.
Proof of Claim 5. Suppose b ∈ T a [t] for some a ∈ A , b ∈ B . We need to show that a ∈ T b [t]. So x ab > 0 and (a, b) ∈ E * . Thus constraint (7) holds for the edge (a, b):
and substitute α u = 2q u − 1 for u ∈ {a, b}. Also observe that b a b x ab = 1 − x ab − b ≺ab x ab . This is because e∈δ(a) x e = 1 by constraint (9) . Similarly, a b a x a b = 1 − x ab − a ≺ b a x a b . Let us make these substitutions as well in constraint (7). Post-substitution, this constraint becomes:
Thus
There are 3 cases here: (1) q b ≤ a :a ≺ b a x a b , (2) q a ≤ b :b ≺ab x ab , and (3) q b > a :a ≺ b a x a b and q a > b :b ≺ab x ab . Note that q u is the length of the blue subarray in the array T u , for u ∈ {a, b}. The following observations are immediate from Equation (11):
-In case (1), q a ≥ b :b ≺ab x ab + x ab . It follows from the increasing order of a's preference in T a that the cell in T a that contains b is entirely in the blue sub-array of T a . More precisely, it is at distance q a − b :b ≺ab x ab − x ab from the end of its blue sub-array, i.e., from the right end of the array T a .
Similarly, the entire cell containing a in T b is in the red sub-array of T b . More precisely, it is at distance a :a ≺ b a x a b − q b from the right end of the array T b in right-to-left orientation. Since q a − b :b ≺ab x ab − x ab = a :a ≺ b a x a b − q b (by Equation (11)), these 2 cells are perfectly aligned with each other in vertical direction. -Case (2) is entirely symmetric to case (1) . The cell in T b that contains a is entirely in its blue sub-array. More precisely, it is at distance q b − a :a ≺ b a x a b − x ab from the start or the left end of the array T b . Similarly, the entire cell containing b in T a is in its red sub-array; more precisely, it is at distance b :b ≺ab x ab − q a from the left end of the array T b . Again, it follows from Equation (11) that these 2 cells are perfectly aligned with each other in vertical direction. -In case (3), the line separating the blue and red sub-arrays of X a went through the cell containing b and similarly, the line separating the red and blue sub-arrays of X b went through the cell containing a. So there is both a blue cell in T a (at the far right end) and a red cell in T a (at the far left end) with b. Similarly, there is a both a blue cell in T b (at the far left end) and a red cell in T b (at the far right end) with a.
As argued in the above 2 cases, it can analogously be shown that the blue cell in T a that contains b exactly matches with the red cell in T b that contains a and vice-versa. Thus a ∈ T t [b] . Hence M t is a valid matching in G.
Proof of Claim 6. We will first prove the popularity of M t by showing a vector γ ∈ {0, ±1} n such that the following three properties are satisfied: (see Section 2 for the definition of wt Mt )
1. γ u = 0 for all u ∈ U and γ u ∈ {±1} for all u ∈ A ∪ B ; 2. γ a + γ b ≥ wt Mt (a, b) for all edges (a, b); 3.
u∈A∪B γ u = 0. This will immediately imply that M t is popular (by Theorem 2). Observe that for each u ∈ A ∪ B , every cell in the array T u is monochromatic: it is either blue or red. Define γ as follows. Since γ u = 0 for each unmatched vertex u, we have u∈A∪B γ u = 0. What is left to show is that property 2 listed above is also satisfied for all (a, b) ∈ E. It follows from [17] that edge covering constraints are satisfied for all edges (a, b) ∈ A ×B . Refer to Fig. 8 : the cells where a vertex a gets matched in x to partners worse than some neighbor b form a contiguous region of the array T a (in a cyclic manner) that begins from the start of its blue sub-array and wraps around T a in left-to-right orientation. Similarly, refer to Fig. 9 : the same holds for b in T b and b's increasing order of partners in x starts from the right end of the blue sub-array in T b and its increasing order of preference is in right-to-left orientation.
Consider constraint (6):
Recall that q u is the length of the blue subarray in the array T u , for u ∈ {a, b}. We now have:
Constraint (12) tells us that the sum of lengths of cells where either a is matched to a partner worse than or equal to b and similarly, b is matched to a partner worse than or equal to a is at most the sum of lengths of the blue sub-arrays in T a and T b . Thus the following conclusions can be drawn:
-if one of a, b is matched in M t to a partner worse than or equal to the other, then either T t [a] or T t [b] is in its blue sub-array.
-if both a and b are matched in M t to partners worse than the other, then both T t [a] and T t [b] are in their blue sub-arrays.
Thus when wt Mt (a, b) = 2 then γ a = γ b = 1 and when wt Mt (a, b) ≥ 0 then either γ a = 1 or γ b = 1. Hence it follows that γ a + γ b ≥ wt Mt (a, b). That is, the edge covering constraint holds for any edge (a, b) ∈ A × B .
The last part of the proof of popularity is to show that property 2 holds for every edge (u, v) ∈ δ(u) where u ∈ U . The vertex u is left unmatched in every dominant matching. So every dominant edge e incident to v must be between v and a neighbor that v prefers to u-otherwise the popularity of the matching that contains e would be violated. Thus v prefers its partner in M t to u and so wt Mt (u, v) = 0.
Recall that (x, α) ∈ P G and we have α u + α v ≥ c x (u, v) = 1 and we also have α u = 0; hence α v = 1. That is, the entire array T v is positive or blue, so γ v = 1. Thus γ u + γ v = 1 > 0 = wt Mt (u, v).
This finishes our proof that M t is popular. We will now prove that M t is a dominant matching. Let ρ = a 0 , b 1 , a 1 , . . . , b k , a k , b k+1 be any M t -augmenting path in G. We have γ a0 = γ b k+1 = 0, hence γ b1 = γ a k = 1, and so γ a1 = γ b k = −1.
Either (i) γ b2 = −1 or (ii) γ b2 = 1 which implies that γ a2 = −1. It is now easy to see that in the path ρ, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} the edge (a i , b i+1 ) has to be labeled (−, −). That is, ρ is not an augmenting path in G Mt . Thus there is no M t -augmenting path in G Mt , hence M t is a dominant matching in G (by Theorem 1).
We present a new proof of the following claim (originally from [7] ) that is used in the proof of Lemma 2. The popular matching M has a witness α ∈ {0, ±1} n : recall that this was the witness used to partition A ∪ B into A 0 ∪ B 0 and (A \ A 0 ) ∪ (B \ B 0 ). We have α u = 0 for all u ∈ A 0 ∪ B 0 and α u ∈ {±1} for all u ∈ (A \ A 0 ) ∪ (B \ B 0 ).
In order to prove the popularity of M * = M 1 ∪ D, we will show a witness β as follows. For the vertices outside A 0 ∪ B 0 , set β u = α u since nothing has changed for these vertices in the transformation M ; M * . For the vertices in A 0 ∪ B 0 , set β u = 1 for u ∈ A 1 ∪ B 1 and β u = −1 for every matched vertex u ∈ A −1 ∪ B −1 . For every unmatched vertex u, set β u = 0.
Thus β u ≥ wt M * (u, u) for all u and u:A∪B β u = 0: this is because D ⊆ (A 1 ×B −1 )∪(A −1 ×B 1 ), so for every edge (a, b) ∈ D, we have β a + β b = 0; recall that α a + α b = 0 for all (a, b) ∈ M 1 . What is left to show is that β a + β b ≥ wt M * (a, b) for every edge (a, b).
The correctness of the Gale-Shapley algorithm in G 0 to compute popular matchings in G 0 immediately implies that every edge with both endpoints in A 0 ∪ B 0 is covered by the sum of β-values of its endpoints (see [8] ). We will now show that every edge with one endpoint in A 0 ∪ B 0 and the other endpoint in (A \ A 0 ) ∪ (B \ B 0 ) is also covered.
-Every edge in A 1 × B 1 is covered since β a + β b = 2 ≥ wt M * (a, b). Similarly every edge in A 1 × B 1 is also covered. Recall that D is a stable matching in G 0 : here every vertex prefers outgoing edges to incoming edges, thus every a ∈ A −1 gets at least as good a partner as S * (a) in D, where S * is the men-optimal stable matching in G 0 ; in turn, S * (a) a M 0 (a) for all a ∈ A. Hence M * (a) a M (a) for every a ∈ A −1 . Thus wt M * (a, b) = −2 = β a + β b . We can similarly show that every edge in A −1 × B 1 is also covered.
Thus M * is a popular matching in G. We can now show that M * is a dominant matching by the same argument as seen at the end of the proof of Claim 6. That is, any popular matching with a witness β ∈ {0, ±1} n such that β u ∈ {±1} for every matched vertex u is a dominant matching. This finishes our proof that M * is a dominant matching in G.
We now present a simple proof of the following claim from [7] used in the proof of Lemma 5.
Claim 8
The matching N = M 0 ∪ S is a stable matching in G.
Proof. The matching S is obtained by running Gale-Shapley algorithm in the graph G 1 on vertex set (A \ A 0 ) ∪ (B \ B 0 ). We did not compute the matching S from scratch -we started with edges of the matching M 1 restricted to A −1 × B 1 . So in the resulting matching S, it is easy to see the following two useful properties:
. This is because to begin with, every b ∈ B 1 is matched to M 1 (b) and b will change her partner only if she receives a proposal from a neighbor better than M 1 (b). -S(a) a M 1 (a) for every a ∈ A 1 . This is because all vertices in B −1 are unmatched in our starting matching and every b ∈ B −1 prefers her partner in M 1 to any neighbor in A −1 (since every edge in A −1 × B −1 is a (−, −) edge wrt M 1 ). Thus in the matching S, a will get accepted either by M 1 (a) or a better neighbor.
It is now easy to show that N is a stable matching. We already know that M 0 is a stable matching on A 0 ∪ B 0 and S is a stable matching on (A \ 
